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Neuroscience, Self-Understanding, and Narrative Truth
Narrating Truths Worth Living:
Addiction Narratives
Doug McConnell,Macquarie University
Anke Snoek,Macquarie University
Self-narrative is often, perhaps primarily, a tool of self-
constitution, not of truth representation. We explore this
theme with reference to our own recent qualitative in-
terviews of substance-dependent agents. Narrative self-
constitution, the process of realizing a valued narrative pro-
jection of oneself, depends on one’s narrative tracking truth
to a certain extent. Therefore, insofar as narratives are suc-
cessfully realized, they have a claim to being true, although
a certain amount of self-deception typically comes along
for the ride. We suggest that, because agents typically value
certain outcomes more highly than truth for truth’s sake,
it makes sense to narrate in ways that aren’t strictly true
if that helps ensure highly valued outcomes do come true.
Walker (2012) outlines three ways of defending the truth
of past-directed narratives, but the role of future-directed
narratives in realizing highly valued truths provides her a
fourth way.
IS NARRATIVE NECESSARY FOR SELF-
CONSTITUTION?
The evidence for this can be built on the experiment that
Walker cites where children described as tidy enhanced
their tidiness more than children told they ought to be
tidy. The narrative interpretation is that being described
as tidy incorporated “tidiness” in self-narrative, which sub-
sequently guided action. The effects of narrative onwhowe
become are likely to bemuchmore significant andpervasive
than this, however. To begin with, we might take control of
the process just described and give ourselves desirable de-
scriptions in hope of fulfilling them. This alone is likely to
enjoy limited success, partially because some descriptions
require more deliberate planning to achieve than improv-
ing tidiness. An addicted person simply describing him- or
herself as “clean” probably won’t see a huge effect on his
or her behavior. However, narrative would provide a much
more powerful effect if, upon narrating a planned course
of action, the chance of carrying out that plan increased.
If this were true, then the agent could complement simply
thinking of him- or herself as “clean”with a variety of plans
to become “clean.” Does narrative projection tend to ensure
the action narrated?
To begin with, there is evidence that intentions play this
role (Holton 1999). An intention is formed when the agent
decides to carry out a certain action. Intentions tend to en-
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sure an action is completed in several ways. When agents
are following an intention they overestimate their degree of
control, are more overconfident in their own abilities, are
more likely to focus on the advantage of success, and are
less receptive to new or peripheral information (Gollwitzer
2003; Gollwitzer and Kinney 1989; Taylor and Gollwitzer
1995) Goal intentions are also more likely to be carried out
if the agent fills in some of the intermediate, sub-intentions
needed to implement it. (Gollwitzer 2004) So once we’ve
decided on an intention and done some initial planning, we
tend to stick with it despite the flux of desires and infor-
mation that would otherwise distract us from our goal. But
if intentions are vital for carrying out action, how do they
relate to narrative? Well, intentions are typically mininarra-
tives. We understand the relationship between the goal and
the planning steps in narrative terms and of course inten-
tions have tomake sense in the light of our wider narratives
and longer term intentions. David Velleman links inten-
tions to the agent’s narrative when he says: “Utterances are
[sometimes] issued as commitments, in the understanding
that they will feed back into your behavior. Hence you do
understand that your running autobiography not only re-
flects but is also reflected in what you do” (Velleman 2005,
213–214) This line of thought ultimately leads to the view
that narratives come true, so “we invent ourselves . . . but
we really are the characterswe invent” (Velleman 2005, 206).
EPISTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON SUCCESSFUL
NARRATIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION
Obviously the agent can’t live out any truth he or she imag-
ines; there are epistemic constraints on who we can each
become. For successful self-transformation one needs to
know of realistic target outcomes (e.g., sobriety), knowwho
one is (e.g., someone who would benefit from sobriety and
is capable of achieving it), and have the ability to narrate a
realistic path to the desired outcome (e.g., how to achieve
sobriety from here). Realistic narrative projections are more
easily enacted than unrealistic ones. When a narrative is
enacted successfully, the narrative projection provides a
ready-made understanding of what just happened. Because
the action was successful this narrative has met a threshold
of accuracy and provides a better basis for ensuring the next
narrative projection is realistic. Successful, narrated action
is therefore a recursive process where accurate narration
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of past action grounds realistic narrative projection.1 These
constraints leave some room to move, however, so that
distorted narratives of the past (the variations of which
Walker highlights) and unrealistic projections can still form
the basis for some degree of success in action. That said,
successful action can only be accompanied by a certain
degree of inaccuracy before the whole project falls apart.
NARRATIVE-AIDED RECOVERY FROM ADDICTION
Narrative helps recovery if the agent develops an accurate
narrative understanding of where they are now. Several
interviewees expressed hope for recovery based on their
improving self-narrative. For example:
“I’ve never . . . really talked about it too much, so yeah it’s
something that hopefully . . . just a different way of thinking
andhow I perceive theworld I suppose andhopefully can open
up some new chapters for me instead of being on this vicious
merry go round that never changes.” (R31)
Then one needs to know how to narrate one’s way from the
current position to a recovered self. The recovery narratives
of others are one source of this information. Drawing on this
narrativematerial, one can shape a narrative tailored to one-
self. Some recovery narratives are more helpful than others
and whether they help or not isn’t just a matter of how true
they are. The typical narratives of addiction that circulate
in society are of celebrities admitting to being mad, bad, or
sad. They show remorse, and claim that it was all a terrible
mistake and that they are going to be a good role model
from now on. Regardless of whether these narratives are
true or just public relations exercises, they lack depth and
the typical addict can’t easily identify with celebrity narra-
tives. In light of this, one advantage of group treatments like
AlcoholicsAnonymous (AA) is that they provide userswith
detailed, relevant recovery narratives (Swora 2001). These
narrativesmight also bemore truthful, given that these peo-
ple aren’t so public relations (PR) conscious. However, it is
interesting to note that they don’t have to be strictly truthful
to be beneficial; some recovery narratives might implicitly
involve useful fictions. Similarly, we can take inspiration
from narratives we know to be fictional as long as we ap-
propriately tailor the material to our own situation.
TRUTH AS A MEANS TO AN END
Because the epistemic constraints for pragmatic success ad-
mit more than one narrative trajectory, it’s plausible that the
same person could achieve the same goal with a variety of
different narrative-self understandings and with a variety
of different narrative paths to the goal. If this is true, then
the narrative trajectory to the goal only needs to be true
enough to achieve it. Some trajectories are going to be better
at realizing the goal than others but not necessarily because
they are truer or more realistic. Indeed, Walker (2010) makes
a similar point elsewhere, arguing that the 12-Step method
of admitting powerlessness over one’s addiction, which is
1. We assume here that success (partial or complete) is measured
according to normative standards.
false, strictly speaking, can paradoxically lead to being able
to regain control.
Narrative projection, particularly in self-transforma
tion, is an imaginative enterprise that requires the agent
to narrate beyond known truths. An addict doesn’t know
if he or she can recover and the addict often have plenty
of evidence that suggests he or she can’t. When we asked
one interviewee where he saw himself in one year’s time,
he replied, “Probably at the exact same spot as where I am
now” (living a lonely life in a deteriorated house). In light
of the statistics, this is a realistic narrative projection but it
will not help him change his situation. A more ambitious
narrative less constrained by known truths would be more
helpful in realizing a truth worth living.
CONCLUSION
Althoughknowledge tends togohand inhandwith success-
ful narrative self-constitution, each supporting the other,
they come apart to some extent. To pursue objective truth
one must take a neutral attitude to the facts, but such an
attitude is detrimental to self-constitution. In pursuit of
self-constitutive goals it is often to the agent’s benefit to
be selective in the facts he or she focuses on, and to fa-
vor certain interpretations of him- or herself and the world.
Given that the typical agent values certain outcomes, like
recovery from addiction, more highly than objective truth,
the person shouldn’t be bothered by a degree of factual dis-
tortion. In other words, the agent should be happy to trade
off some truth in various aspects of his or her narrative in
order to secure the truth of the things that matter the most.
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